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Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
was initially identified in an outbreak 
of viral pneumonia in Wuhan, People’s 
Republic of China, in December 2019, 
and it has now been recognized in 77 
countries with over 90  000 laboratory-
confirmed cases and over 3000 deaths 
as of March 3, 2020 [1]. The epidemi-
ology of COVID-19 has recently become 
clearer as incident cases continue to rise 
and researchers refine estimates of the 
severity, transmissibility, and popula-
tions affected. Based on available data, 
COVID-19 is efficiently transmitted in 
the community, and the proportion of 
infections leading to severe illness is par-
ticularly high among adults ≥50  years 
of age and among individuals with co-
morbid health conditions. Although 
rare, severe cases have also been re-
ported among younger individuals. 
Thus far, the estimated basic reproduc-
tive number of COVID-19 is higher than 
that of influenza [2], as is the case fatality 
risk for adults and older individuals.
An estimated 80% of COVID-19 cases 
are mild [1]. This is not a glass-half-full 
statistic, because 20% of infections result 
in clinically severe cases that have the 
potential to overwhelm already over-
burdened health facilities. Given the 
lack of vaccines and effective antivirals, 
nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) 
are the most effective available interven-
tions for local and global control and 
mitigation of COVID-19. To date, meas-
ures aimed at slowing introduction of 
infection globally have included travel 
restrictions, isolation of confirmed cases, 
and quarantine of exposed persons. In 
the United States, NPIs have reduced the 
number of infected persons entering the 
country, but recent outbreaks in multiple 
US states make it clear that these meas-
ures have delayed but not prevented 
community transmission. In 2009, NPIs 
were able to delay large epidemic waves 
of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
in some locations until after the summer, 
because influenza transmission tends to 
be reduced by higher temperatures and 
humidity. It is unclear whether COVID-
19 transmission will be heavily affected 
by seasonal weather variation, given that 
transmission is now occurring in mul-
tiple tropical and subtropical locations.
Given the many uncertainties re-
garding the potential for widespread 
community transmission of COVID-19, 
community mitigation measures to curb 
local transmission must be carefully 
considered and applied where possible. 
In the 1918/1919 influenza pandemic, 
timely and sustained use of a broad set of 
NPIs including school closures, banning 
of mass gatherings, mandatory wearing 
of masks, isolation of ill persons, and 
appropriate disinfection and/or hygiene 
measures reduced mortality in several 
US cities [3]. These measures decreased 
transmission, spread the epidemic over a 
longer period of time, reduced the height 
of the epidemic peak, and reduced the 
overall number of infected persons and 
overall health impact. In this study, we 
discuss NPIs that may be most effec-





Personal protective measures such as 
hand hygiene and face mask use are in-
cluded in public health guidelines for 
pandemic preparedness. Hand hygiene 
effectively reduces the transmission of 
respiratory infections through indirect 
contact in the community setting, and 
it should be practiced by ill individuals, 
their contacts, and the larger population 
to limit the risk of transmission through 
fomites [4]. Most coronaviruses, in-
cluding severe acute respiratory syn-
drome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), 
are inactivated by alcohol-based hand 
sanitizers and disinfectants such as 
bleach. Environmental disinfection with 
appropriate sanitizers is also recom-
mended [4].
Because hand hygiene does not af-
fect direct transmission of COVID-19 
by respiratory droplets or aerosols, face 
masks have been widely deployed by 
at-risk populations in China and some 
other locations in Asia, for example, in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. The efficacy of 
face masks among healthy individuals is 
unclear, but masks may protect others, 
particularly healthcare workers, from 
actively symptomatic individuals with 
COVID-19. However, the combination of 
masks and hand hygiene has been shown 
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to reduce transmission of respiratory vir-
uses and serves to highlight that layering 
of NPIs is more effective at reducing dis-
ease transmission than any NPI alone 
[4]. Mask use could be recommended for 
ill persons, for uninfected persons who 
are caring for ill persons, and for those 
interacting in highly crowded settings 
where widespread community transmis-
sion is known to be occurring. If face 
masks are widely recommended, de-
mand may quickly exhaust limited sup-
plies that are most critical for reducing 
transmission in high-exposure settings 
such as hospitals and clinics. This bal-
ance requires careful attention. N95 
masks should be preserved for medical 
personnel only.
ISOLATION OF ILL AND 
QUARANTINE OF EXPOSED 
PERSONS
In some locations around the world, 
confirmed cases of COVID-19 are being 
medically isolated in hospitals, and their 
close contacts are being carefully traced 
and quarantined at home or in desig-
nated quarantine facilities. This requires 
intense laboratory surveillance to pick 
up COVID-19 cases in the community, 
including cases with mild illness. To date 
(March 13, 2020), these containment 
measures appear to have been able to 
prevent sustained local transmission in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.
Medical isolation of cases has been fea-
sible in outbreaks of SARS and Middle 
East respiratory syndrome (MERS) be-
cause infections are generally severe and 
of a limited number, but similar practices 
are less useful in influenza epidemics be-
cause of the huge number of cases and dif-
ficulties in identifying mild infections [5]. 
Quarantine of asymptomatic exposed per-
sons has also been used to contain SARS 
and MERS outbreaks, but it will not be 
feasible in designated quarantine facilities 
if there is widespread community trans-
mission of COVID-19. Moreover, quar-
antine measures can be costly, challenging 
to enforce, and introduce location-specific 
ethical and legal challenges that may 
hamper control efforts. Perhaps the most 
important NPIs in this domain are strong, 
coordinated public health messaging to 
self-isolate when ill. Previous work has 
demonstrated that the speed with which 
infected populations are quarantined, 
through a combination of hospital-based 
isolation and self-quarantining, acceler-
ates during epidemics of emerging dis-
ease such as COVID-19 [6]. Public health 
messaging to leverage and augment this 
natural acceleration of isolation and quar-
antine practices may be critical in the 
context of widespread community trans-
mission. Expanding access to surveillance 
and diagnostic testing is also critical to 
identify transmission clusters where isola-
tion is most important.
COMMUNITY MITIGATION 
MEASURES
In most locations, containment efforts 
are likely to be ineffective in preventing 
Table 1. Characteristics and Transmission Dynamics of COVID-19, SARS, MERS and Influenza
Characteristic COVID-19 (SARS-CoV-2 Infection) SARS-CoV/MERS-CoV Infection
Influenza Virus Infection (Including Sea-
sonal Epidemics and Pandemics)
Clinical severity profile Can cause severe disease, most infections 
mild
Causes almost exclusively  
severe disease
Can cause severe disease, most infec-
tions mild
Infection fatality riska Unclear but could be in the range of 0.5% 
to 1%
10% to 30% Seasonal: ≤0.1%  
1918/1919 pandemic: 2%
Incubation period Mean 5–6 days, upper limit approximately 
14 days
Mean 3–5 days, upper limit  
approximately 14 days
Mean 1 day, upper limit approximately 
3 days
Basic reproductive numberb Thought to be approximately 1.5 to 3.0 SARS: 1.5 to 4  
MERS: 0.5 to 1
Thought to be approximately 1.5 to 2.0
Modes of transmission Not established but presumed to be  
mainly respiratory droplets and spread  
via fomites. Aerosols and fecal-oral  
might play some role.
Mainly respiratory droplets, some  
evidence of spread via fomites 
Mainly respiratory droplets, may also 
spread through aerosols and fomites
Infectiousness profile Most infectious around the time of illness 
onset, infectiousness may start slightly 
before illness onset
Most infectious 7–10 days  
after illness onset
Most infectious around the time of 
illness onset
Location of person- 
to-person transmission
Mainly community, can also spread  
in hospitals
Mainly spreads in hospitals Mainly community, can also spread in 
hospitals
Importance of children in  
transmission dynamics
Unclear. Children can become infected  
but have mild symptoms. 
Not important Very important
Possible to contain an  
outbreak and avoid  
widespread transmission?
Unlikelyc Yes with careful isolation of cases,  
quarantine of their contacts, and  
appropriate hospital infection control
Not possible
Abbreviations: CoV, coronavirus; COVID-19, Coronavirus Disease 2019; MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome.
aThe proportion of infections that will ultimately be fatal (note: this is likely to vary by age).
bThe expected number of additional cases that 1 case will generate, on average, over the course of its infectious period in an otherwise uninfected population (note that this can vary by 
location for a variety of reasons).
cAs of writing in early March 2020, it appears that China has contained its first wave of infections, but only by using very extreme measures including mass isolation/quarantine outside the 
home and monitoring of social distancing based on cell phone and strict enforcement by local officials.
epidemics, and public health measures 
will be needed to mitigate the pandemic 
impact at a local level [7]. As local epi-
demics progress towards a peak in inci-
dence, there will be a surge in healthcare 
demand, and particularly the demand 
for intensive care, to a level that is likely 
to overwhelm the healthcare system. 
The aim of mitigation is to reduce this 
surge as much as possible. Community 
mitigation measures generally promote 
social distancing to reduce transmission, 
but they can be extremely disruptive 
and have population-specific economic 
consequences [5]. Similar to influenza 
pandemics, mitigation measures that 
could be considered for COVID-19 in-
clude the temporary closure of schools 
and workplaces and cancellation of mass 
gatherings for a period of time to flatten 
the epidemic peak. Voluntary avoidance 
measures, where people choose to stay at 
home more often, will also contribute to 
social distancing.
Careful consideration of the positive 
and negative effects of school closures in 
the United States is critical, because pro-
longed closures disproportionately affect 
low-income families and must include 
contingency plans for providing free 
meals and other programming to families 
that rely on school-based learning and ec-
onomic support. Currently, it appears that 
children can be infected as easily as adults; 
however, the risk of severe disease is very 
low in this group. Given that children can 
be infected, it is reasonable to believe that 
they would also be contagious, although 
the importance of children in community 
transmission of COVID-19 has not yet 
been quantified. Closure of workplaces 
introduces similar ethical concerns, be-
cause low-income workers often have lim-
ited ability to work from home without 
loss of pay and other benefits. Careful 
evaluation should be given to the timing 
and duration of community mitigation 
measures to maximize the beneficial epi-
demiologic effects while minimizing so-
cial and economic harm.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the evolving picture of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the application 
of layered, multifaceted, location- and 
population-specific NPIs will need to be 
considered and initiated quickly to curb 
widespread transmission. When NPIs 
are “reactive” to widespread transmis-
sion, instead of “proactive” to the poten-
tial for transmission, they often fail to 
reduce rates of illness. The types of pro-
active measures we describe here were 
successful in mitigating the 1918/1919 
influenza pandemic and may be just as 
valuable almost a century later.
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